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S E V E N
THE NHS IN BRITAIN: ANY LESSON FROM HISTORY FOR 
UNIVERSAL HEALTH COVERAGE?
At its inception in 1948 the British National Health Service 
(NHS) was regarded as highly distinctive, with its features 
of universal health coverage (UHC), comprehensive 
provision and services free at the point of use.1 In the 
following decades, Britain also pioneered new methods of 
‘universalising the best’, so that UHC did not simply extend 
access to inferior services. As we approach the post-2015 
Millennium Development Goals with universalism firmly 
on the agenda, what can we learn from the experience of a 
forerunner? This chapter sketches the history of Britain’s 
health system and discusses ideas about its development 
and performance. 
Before the NHS, Britain had an apparently successful 
mixed economy of health care, blending private, public 
and voluntary provision. By 1900 there were some 800 
voluntary hospitals in which acute care was given, 
funded largely by philanthropy. The local state provided 
institutional care through the Poor Law, though mostly in 
low-quality, stigmatising workhouses. Local government 
also delivered public health services, both environmental 
and increasingly clinical, for mothers, children and 
infectious disease sufferers. Primary care was partly 
1. For further reading on the history of the NHS, see Martin Gorsky, “The 
British National Health Service 1948–2008: A Review of the Historiogra-
phy,” Social History of Medicine 21, no. 3 (2008): 437–60.
commercial and partly accessed through friendly societies, 
a form of sickness insurance rooted in working-class 
culture. Change came first in 1911, when the foundations 
of the welfare state were laid. Borrowing from Bismarck’s 
model, National Health Insurance (NHI) legislation scaled 
up friendly society sickness cover, making it compulsory 
for manual labourers.  
Why though, by 1948, had Britain diverged from 
the trajectory of countries taking the NHI route to 
universalism, like Germany, France and Japan? Standard 
accounts emphasize growing financial difficulties in the 
voluntary hospitals, as charity proved inadequate to mass 
demand, leaving user fees or unsystematic contributory 
schemes to fill the gap. Meanwhile popular sentiment 
rejected the deterrent philosophy underpinning the Poor 
Law. As municipal medicine expanded, opinion shifted 
to accept public provision as a right of citizenship, not a 
dispensation for the marginal. Dissatisfaction also grew 
towards the limitations of NHI, which by 1938 covered 
some 54 per cent of the population, though excluded 
not only the middle class but also those outside the 
workplace, principally women, children and older people. 
Thus a growing reform consensus emerged in the 1930s 
among health bureaucrats and medical elites in favour of 
greater rationalisation and integration. The immediate 
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catalyst though was World War II, and the formation of 
a state-directed Emergency Medical Service to deal with 
military and civilian casualties. Then came the Beveridge 
Report, whose popular blueprint for a postwar welfare 
state promised to slay the ‘five giants’: ‘want’, ‘ignorance’, 
‘squalor’, ‘idleness’ and ‘disease’.  
It was the political expectation raised by Beveridge which 
set the context for the NHS legislation of 1946/7. Planning 
had begun under the wartime coalition government and 
a 1944 White Paper proposed a pluralist, localist NHS. 
This was soon mired in disagreement between the interest 
groups, and only when the left-wing Labour Party won a 
large electoral majority in 1945 was the stalemate broken. 
A unified, hierarchical system was established instead, 
with all hospitals ‘nationalised’ under appointed boards; 
GPs remained independent but became NHS contractors 
overseen by executive committees. Local government 
retained only minimal public health responsibilities, 
though a network of new health centres was planned in 
which primary and preventive care would be merged. Most 
finance came from the Treasury, apportioned according 
to existing expenditure patterns. Local democracy was 
now replaced by accountability to Parliament, and central 
ministerial responsibility.   
How do theorists of health system development account 
for this outcome? Like all the pioneer welfare states, Britain 
was a rich country, though comparative researchers find 
no consistent correlation between level of development 
and state health spending. One classic argument 
emphasizes early democratisation, the broadening of 
political citizenship bringing social entitlement in its train. 
It is certainly true that health and welfare had entered 
party electoral platforms by 1911. However, the earlier 
start of authoritarian Germany confounds this general 
explanation. Some Marxist theorists claim that labour 
mobilisation is the key, though in Britain trade unions and 
friendly societies were ambivalent towards NHI in 1911. 
Instead the ‘legitimation’ thesis, by which ruling classes 
conceded welfare to dampen socialism’s appeal, seems 
more plausible. Labour’s importance was undoubted in 
1948 however, with Bevan’s socialist stance underpinning 
hospital nationalisation and the redistributive mode of 
funding. British governance structures were also conducive 
to reform.  A professional, neutral civil service was 
established from the 1850s, a broadening tax base fostered 
popular consent, and bureaucratic expertise in health was 
nurtured in the Local Government Board (1871) and then 
a Ministry of Health (1919). The electoral system typically 
delivered strong majorities to a single party, whose cabinet 
leadership proposed legislation; a strong party ‘whip’ 
guaranteed internal loyalty, and the legislative process 
offered few veto points to oppositional pressure groups. 
Lastly, political culture mattered, both at the elite level, 
where collectivist thought displaced individualism, and the 
popular, where charity hospitals and friendly societies had 
long engrained acceptance of free health care and mutual 
contribution.
So, universal coverage was achieved in 1948, and the 
early years saw a backlog of need addressed. It was soon 
clear however, that Bevan’s assumption of demand quickly 
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stabilising was misplaced.  Instead, like all health systems 
in advanced industrial nations, rising health spending 
exerted relentless pressure, fuelled by costly technologies, 
aging populations and consumerist expectations. There 
was also the founding promise that the NHS would 
‘universalise the best’, with its implication that policy 
should enhance equity of access to high quality services. 
What also became clear, as comparative national indicators 
were standardised, was that the NHS model system was 
relatively cheap. Typically the UK spent a lower proportion 
of GDP on health than comparable high income nations, 
such as the United States, Germany and France, and, when 
broader economic policy dictated, expenditure growth 
was periodically restrained. UK policy-makers generally 
took this as effective cost containment rather than under-
funding, dismissing comparatively poor population health 
indicators as too crude, at least until the 2000s when 
compelling evidence emerged of a British lag in outcomes. 
Some commentators ascribed this to the long period of 
tight settlements during the Conservative hegemony of 
the 1980s and 1990s, which ended the broadly bipartisan 
consensus for growth in the early decades, and which Tony 
Blair ’s New Labour sought to overturn.
With the levers of the state controlling both finance 
and provision much scope existed for technocratic 
‘supply-side’ policies, which sought, in a resource limited 
system, to ensure gradual improvement in equity of access 
regardless of place, income or condition. In the 1950s and 
1960s progress was fairly modest. In the hospital sector 
standardised accounting, regional purchasing and financial 
controls improved institutional efficiency, though on 
the clinical side there was only modest redistribution of 
medical specialties. The 1962 Hospital Plan began the 
process of replacing unsuitable Victorian infrastructure 
with new general hospitals, designed to meet accepted 
bed/population ratios; the reality fell short of the ideal 
however. In primary care the promised network of health 
centres also failed due to postwar austerity and professional 
hostility, but a new GP contract which offered better pay, 
cheap borrowing and administrative support raised quality 
and encouraged joint practices.  
The arrival of health economists heralded more ambitious 
and complex programmes. In the 1970s the Resource 
Allocation Working Party devised a weighted population 
formula which progressively redistributed financing 
across and within regions. ‘Programme budgeting’ began a 
similar reallocation of resources across different activities: 
acute care, mental health, older people, and so on. As the 
fiscal crisis of the welfare state intensified in the 1980s, 
Mrs Thatcher’s approach emphasized cost containment 
over equity, and the Black Report, a celebrated report 
on inequalities of outcome, was sidelined. Rejecting a 
radical ‘privatisation’ approach as politically impossible, 
the Conservatives concentrated first on introducing 
commercial management disciplines into the NHS, 
alongside multiple performance indicators. The more 
sweeping ‘internal market’ reforms in the 1990s aimed 
to inject consumer demand and supplier incentives into 
the service, with organisations representing primary care 
becoming ‘purchasers’ of services that quasi-independent 
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hospital trusts would provide. Statist instruments were 
revived by New Labour, including publication of league 
tables to incentivise performance—‘targets and terror’—
and the establishment of the National Institute of Clinical 
Excellence (NICE), which soon won international plaudits 
for its impartial and transparent approach to health 
technology assessment.  
In sum, Britain’s NHS probably deserves the criticism that 
it ‘institutionalised parsimony’ ,2 and although it generally 
scores highly on equity indicators, it is not always well-
placed in comparative rankings of health outcomes.  But 
nor is it that badly-placed either, and it is noteworthy that 
public satisfaction tends to rise alongside spending levels 
rather than in response to periodic structural reforms.  The 
NHS has repeatedly demonstrated capacity for innovation 
within a statist system, and allayed uninformed prejudice 
against ‘socialised medicine’. On balance the affection 
it retains vindicates its founder’s belief that a society 
becomes ‘. . . more wholesome, more serene, and spiritually 
healthier, if its citizens have the knowledge that they and 
their fellows, have access, when ill, to the best that medical 
skill can provide.’ 3
Dr Martin Gorsky 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
United Kingdom
2. R. Klein, The New Politics of the NHS (Oxford: Radcliffe Publishing, 2006), 
253.
3. A. Bevan, In Place of Fear (London: Simon & Schuster, 1952), 75.
